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We consider the notion of canonical attacks, which are the cryptographic analog of the canonical
forms of a one-mode Gaussian channel. Using this notion, we explore the connections between the
degradability properties of the channel and its security for quantum key distribution. Finally, we
also show some relations between canonical attacks and optimal Gaussian cloners.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, quantum cryptography is one of the most promising areas in quantum information science. This is partic-
ularly true in the framework of continuous variable (CV) systems [1], which are quantum systems characterized by
infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. The increasing interest in CV quantum cryptography is mainly due to the prac-
tical advantages of quantum key distribution (QKD) using Gaussian states [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. Furthermore, this Gaussian
QKD has been also extended to multiple quantum communications [7] and the non-trivial possibility of a quantum
direct communication has been also explored [8]. Very recently, a new insight in the theory of quantum channels
has been provided by the canonical classification of the one-mode Gaussian channels [9] (see also Refs. [10, 11] and
the compact version of this classification in Ref. [5]). These channels have been proven to be unitarily equivalent to
canonical forms of six different classes [9], whose degradability properties have been also studied [11]. Here, we exploit
these concepts in the scenario of quantum cryptography. In particular, we consider the notion of canonical attacks
as the cryptographic analog of the canonical forms. By adopting the individual version of these canonical attacks,
we explore the connections between the degradability properties of the channel and its security for QKD. Then, we
also show when (and in what sense) these attacks can be considered equivalent to individual attacks using optimal
Gaussian cloners.
II. QUANTUM COMMUNICATION SCENARIO
The simplest continuous variable system is a single bosonic mode, i.e., a quantum system described by a pair of
quadrature operators xˆT := (qˆ, pˆ) with [qˆ, pˆ] = 2i. In particular, a single-mode bosonic state ρ with Gaussian statistics
is called Gaussian state and it is completely characterized by a 2× 2 covariance matrix V plus a displacement vector
x¯ ∈ R2. Then, a one-mode Gaussian channel is a completely positive trace-preserving (CPT) map G(T,N,d)
transforming an input Gaussian state ρa(Va, x¯a) of a sender (Alice) into an output Gaussian state ρb(Vb, x¯b) of a
receiver (Bob) via the relations Vb = TVaT
T +N and x¯b = Tx¯a+d. Here, d ∈ R2 and T,N are 2× 2 real matrices,
with NT =N > 0 and detN ≥ (detT− 1)2. Up to unitaries on the input and the output, every one-mode Gaussian
channel is equivalent to a map C, called the canonical form, which is a Gaussian channel with d = 0 and Tc,Nc
diagonal [9]. According to Ref. [5], the explicit expressions of Tc and Nc depend on three symplectic invariants of
the channel: the generalized transmission τ := detT (ranging from −∞ to +∞), the rank r := [rk(T)rk(N)]/2 (with
possible values r = 0, 1, 2) and the temperature n¯ (which is a positive number related to detN [5]). These three
invariants {τ, r, n¯} completely characterize the two matrices Tc,Nc and, therefore, the corresponding canonical form
C = C(τ, r, n¯). In particular, the first two invariants {τ, r} determine the class of the form [5, 9]. The full classification
is explicitly shown in the following table
τ r Class Form Tc Nc
0 0 A1 C(0, 0, n¯) 0 (2n¯+ 1)I
0 1 A2 C(0, 1, n¯) I+Z2 (2n¯+ 1)I
1 1 B1 C(1, 1, 0) I I−Z2
1 2 B2 C(1, 2, n¯) I n¯I
1 0 B2(Id) C(1, 0, 0) I 0
(0, 1) 2 C(Att) C(τ, 2, n¯) √τI (1 − τ)(2n¯+ 1)I
> 1 2 C(Amp) C(τ, 2, n¯) √τI (τ − 1)(2n¯+ 1)I
< 0 2 D C(τ, 2, n¯) √−τZ (1 − τ)(2n¯+ 1)I
2In this table, the values of {τ, r} in the first two columns specify a particular class A1, A2, B1, B2, C and D [12]. Within
each class, the possible canonical forms are expressed in the third column, where also the third invariant n¯ must be
considered. The corresponding expressions of Tc,Nc are shown in the last two columns, where Z := diag(1,−1),
I := diag(1, 1) and 0 is the zero matrix.
By adopting a Stinespring dilation of the quantum channel, we can describe a canonical form C(τ, r, n¯) via a
symplectic transformationMaee˜ mixing the input signal mode {a} with two vacuum environmental modes {e, e˜} and
yielding the output modes {b} for Bob and {c, c˜} for the environment [see Fig. 1(i)]. Such a dilation is known to
be unique up to partial isometries. For class B2, also known as an additive-noise channel, the Stinespring dilation
corresponds to an optimal Gaussian cloner (OGC) which clones asymmetrically in the clones but symmetrically in
the quadratures [13]. Such a machine transforms the input mode {a} and the two vacuum modes {e, e˜} into a pair
of clone modes {b, c} and an anticlone mode {c˜}. In particular the reduced state of the output clone k = b, c is given
by the modulated state
ρk =
∫
d2γ Gχk(γ)Dˆ(γ)ρaDˆ
†(γ) , Gχk (γ) :=
1
piχk
exp
(
−|γ|
2
χk
)
, (1)
where Dˆ(γ) is the displacement operator and χk is the cloning noise variance satisfying χbχc = 1 with χb = n¯.
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FIG. 1: Inset (i): Stinespring dilation of a canonical form. It describes a canonical attack by including the optimal coherent
detection of all the outputs {c, c˜} collected in all the uses of the channel. Both the dilation and the attack are unique up to
isometries acting on the environmental modes {c, c˜}. Inset (ii): Stinespring dilation of a canonical form of every class but B2;
the form is antidegradable (degradable) if there exists a map A (D) such that ρb = A(ρcc˜) [ρcc˜ = D(ρb)]. Inset (iii): Physical
representation of a canonical form of every class but B2; the form is strongly antidegradable (weakly degradable) if there exists
a map As (Dw) such that ρb = A
s(ρc) [ρc = D
w(ρb)].
It is important to notice that class B2 is the unique class where the Stinespring dilation cannot be simplified to
a single-mode description [9]. For all the other classes, in fact, we can consider a dilation where the symplectic
transformation Maee˜ can be decomposed as Mae ⊕ Ie˜, involving the signal mode {a} and only one mode {e} of the
two-mode environment {e, e˜} [see Fig. 1(ii)]. This is possible if the environment is prepared in a two-mode squeezed
vacuum (TMSV) state |ω〉ee˜, i.e., in a pure Gaussian state with correlation matrix
Vee˜(ω) =
(
ωI
√
ω2 − 1Z√
ω2 − 1Z ωI
)
, ω := 2n¯+ 1 ≥ 1 . (2)
Such a dilation {Mae⊕Ie˜, |ω〉} is the purification of a single-mode physical representation [14] {Mae, ρ(n¯)}, whereMae
mixes the signal mode {a} with a single environmental mode {e}, prepared in a thermal state ρe(n¯) with n¯ average
photons [11]. This physical representation can also be seen as a quantum broadcast channel where the symplectic
Mae relates the output quadratures xˆ
T
out = (qˆb, pˆb, qˆc, pˆc) of two receivers (Bob and Charlie) to the input quadratures
xˆ
T
in = (qˆa, pˆa, qˆe, pˆe) of a sender (Alice) and a thermal environment [see Fig. 1(iii)].
An important property of all the canonical forms (except B2 [15]) is their degradability or antidegradability [11,
16]. A canonical form is called strongly antidegradable if it has a single-mode physical representation {Mae, ρ(n¯)}
3where Charlie can reconstruct Bob’s state ρb via some CPT map As, i.e., ρb = As(ρc). Notice that the strong
antidegradability {a} → {c} → {b} is a sufficient but not necessary condition for the (standard) antidegradability
{a} → {c, c˜} → {b}, where Bob’s state is reconstructed by considering all the degrees of freedom of the environment
(Eve). In fact, the form is called antidegradable if there exists a CPT map A such that ρb = A(ρcc˜). In the same
way, one can consider the weak degradability {a} → {b} → {c} which is implied by the (standard) degradability
{a} → {b} → {c, c˜}. In fact, degradability corresponds to the existence of a map D such that ρcc˜ = D(ρb), while
weak degradability corresponds to the existence of a map Dw such that ρc = Dw(ρb) for some physical representation.
Clearly the weak/strong notions coincide with the standard ones when n¯ = 1.
From the point of view of practical quantum cryptography, classes C and D are the most important ones. These
classes are full-rank (r = 2) and represent the unique classes where the invariant τ can take a continuum of values,
except for the singular points τ = 0 and τ = 1. Because of this continuity, we call the canonical forms C(τ, 2, n¯) of
classes C and D as regular. For these forms, one can consider a single-mode physical representation {Mae, ρ(n¯)} with
symplectic matrix
Mae(τ) =


√
|τ | 0
√
|1− τ | 0
0 s(τ)
√
|τ | 0 s(1− τ)
√
|1− τ |
s(τ − 1)
√
|1− τ | 0 s(τ)
√
|τ | 0
0 −
√
|1− τ | 0
√
|τ |

 , (3)
where s(· · · ) is the sign function. Notice that Eq. (3) corresponds to a beam splitter for 0 < τ < 1 and to an amplifier
for τ > 1. A regular canonical form C(τ, 2, n¯) is strongly antidegradable (weakly degradable) if and only if τ ≤ 1/2
(τ ≥ 1/2) [11].
III. QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY SCENARIO
In the standard scenario of quantum cryptography, the environment is completely under control of a malicious
eavesdropper (Eve). Here, a one-mode channel can be generally seen as the effect of a collective attack, where Eve
probes the signals using individual interactions and then performs a coherent detection of all the outputs collected
in all the uses of the channel. According to Ref. [5], one can define as a “canonical attack” a collective attack that
generates a one-mode Gaussian channel in canonical form. This is actually a particular form of the most general
collective Gaussian attack that is completely characterized in Ref. [5]. Up to partial isometries, a canonical attack is
described by combining the two-mode Stinespring dilation {Maee˜, |0〉} of the canonical form with the optimal coherent
detection of all the environmental outputs, which are collected in all the uses of the channel [see Fig. 1(i) including
Eve]. In the special case of the class B2, the corresponding B2 canonical attacks are OGC attacks where both the
clone and anticlone are used in the final coherent measurement. In all the other cases, the canonical attacks can
be simplified according to Fig. 1(ii) where Eve uses a single-mode symplectic interaction Mae and the TMSV state
specified by Eq. (2). In particular, the regular canonical attacks are the ones with Mae(τ) given in Eq. (3). These
attacks can be associated to a pair {τ, ω} with τ 6= 0, 1.
In this paper, we consider the individual version of the regular canonical attacks (denoted by {τ, ω}ind), where Eve
is restricted to incoherent detections of her outputs (and no isometry is applied). By adopting this kind of attack, we
derive the security thresholds of the coherent state protocol of Ref. [3]. In this protocol, Alice prepares a coherent
state ρa := |α〉 〈α| whose amplitude α is Gaussianly modulated with variance µ. Then, Alice sends the state through
the channel, whose output is homodyned by Bob. In particular, Bob randomly switches between the detection of
qˆb and pˆb, the effective sequence being classically communicated at the end of the protocol (basis revelation). Here,
the optimal attack {τ, ω}ind is a direct generalization of the delayed-choice entangling cloner attack of Ref. [3, 17]
(retrieved in the particular case 0 < τ < 1). This means that Eve stores all her outputs in a quantum memory, awaits
the basis revelation and, then, performs the correct sequence of qˆ and pˆ detections on her outputs. This is equivalent
to saying that, for each run of the protocol where Bob chooses the qˆ quadrature, Eve also detects the qˆ quadrature
on her modes {c, c˜}. In particular, we can assume as first detection one of qˆc˜, which is equivalent to the remote
preparation of a qˆ-squeezed state on the input mode {e} with variance 〈qˆ2e〉 = ω−1 [17]. As a consequence, Eve is
always able to control the input environment {e} in such a way as to enhance her detection of the output mode {c}
in the same quadrature which is effectively chosen by Bob.
By adopting this optimal attack, let us explicitly derive the security thresholds of the coherent state protocol in the
limit of high modulation µ→ +∞. From Eqs. (2) and (3), we derive the following variance and conditional variance
for Bob’s output
VB(µ) =
〈
qˆ2b
〉
=
〈
pˆ2b
〉
= |τ | (µ+ 1) + |1− τ |ω , VB|A = VB(µ = 0) . (4)
4Then, we have the following signal-to-noise formula for the classical mutual information
IAB :=
1
2
log
VB
VB|A
µ≫1→ 1
2
log
µ
η(ω, τ)
, (5)
where the total noise η(ω, τ) := ∆+ χ(ω, τ) is given by the sum of the quantum shot-noise ∆ = 1 and the equivalent
noise of the channel
χ(ω, τ) =
∣∣∣∣1− ττ
∣∣∣∣ω . (6)
From the point of view of the classical mutual information of Eq. (5), the regular canonical form C(τ, 2, n¯) is equivalent
to a form C(1, 2, n¯) of the classB2 (additive-noise channel), where the input classical signal α with Gaussian modulation
µ is subject to the additive Gaussian noises χ and ∆ (coming from the channel and the measurement, respectively).
In fact, in such a case, we would have
VB = µ+∆+ χ , VB|A = ∆+ χ , (7)
which leads exactly to Eq. (5) for µ→ +∞. In order to analyze the security thresholds, it is useful to introduce the
so-called excess noise
ε := η(ω, τ)− η(1, τ) =
∣∣∣∣1− ττ
∣∣∣∣ (ω − 1) (8)
so that
χ(ε, τ) =
∣∣∣∣1− ττ
∣∣∣∣+ ε , (9)
i.e., the equivalent noise can be decomposed in pure-τ noise and excess noise ε ≥ 0. Roughly speaking, ε quantifies the
effect of the input thermal noise (ω) in the equivalent additive description of the quantum channel, which is specified
by Eq. (7).
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FIG. 2: Security thresholds in DR (thin curve) and RR (thick curve) in the presence of an individual and regular canonical
attack {τ, ω}ind (where τ 6= 0, 1). Such thresholds are expressed in terms of maximum-tolerable excess noise ε versus τ . For a
given τ , only the positive ε′s below the curves are secure.
In order to derive the security thresholds, let us compute the mutual information IAE (between Alice and Eve) and
IBE (between Bob and Eve). It is easy to check that
VE(µ) =
〈
qˆ2c
〉
=
〈
pˆ2c
〉
= |1− τ | (µ+ 1) + |τ |ω−1 , (10)
VE|A = |1− τ |+ |τ |ω−1 , VB|E =
[|τ | (µ+ 1)−1 + |1− τ |ω]−1 , (11)
and, therefore,
IAE :=
1
2
log
VE
VE|A
µ≫1→ 1
2
log
µ
1 + χ−1
, IBE :=
1
2
log
VB
VB|E
µ≫1→ 1
2
log τ2χµ . (12)
5Then, we can compute the secret-key rates in direct reconciliation (DR, ◮) and reverse reconciliation (RR, ◭), i.e.,
R◮ := IAB − IAE → 1
2
log
1 + χ−1
1 + χ
, R◭ := IAB − IBE → 1
2
log
1
τ2χ(1 + χ)
. (13)
From R◮ = 0 we derive the security threshold χ(ε, τ) = 1 or, equivalently, the curve ε◮ = ε◮(τ) shown in Fig. 2.
From such a figure we clearly see how strong antidegradability (holding for τ ≤ 1/2) is a sufficient condition for the
insecurity of the channel in DR (since ε◮ = 0 for every τ ≤ 1/2). However, it is not a necessary condition as shown by
the existence of the insecure regions for τ ≥ 1/2 and ε > ε◮(τ) (where the channel is insecure but weakly degradable).
This is a consequence of the fact that Eve is much more powerful than Charlie, thanks to her active control of the
input environment. In fact, even if no strong antidegradability can be found in the range τ ≥ 1/2, the channel can be
still antidegradable, e.g., within the insecure regions for τ ≥ 1/2 and ε > ε◮(τ). We recover a full equivalence between
strong antidegradability and insecurity only in the case ε = 0, where the channel does not introduce thermal noise.
In such a case, in fact, the strong antidegradability coincides with the standard antidegradability and the security
threshold (τ = 1/2) corresponds exactly to the threshold between antidegradability and degradability.
The fact that the strong antidegradability is a sufficient condition for the insecurity in DR is quite obvious. In
fact, it implies the antidegradability, where Eve can reconstruct Bob’s state and, therefore, retrieve at least the same
information of Bob in decoding Alice’s signals (i.e., ∃As ⇒ ∃A ⇒ IAE ≥ IAB). However, the situation is completely
different in RR, where Alice and Eve try to guess Bob’s outcomes. In such a case, even if the channel is strongly
antidegradable, Bob’s outcomes can be much more correlated to Alice’s variables than Eve’s ones. In general, the
only way for Eve to beat Alice in RR consists in introducing an environment which is squeezed enough to make her
correlations prevail. From R◭ = 0 we derive the discontinuous [18] security threshold
ε◭ = ε◭(τ) :=
√
4 + τ2 − |τ | − 2 |1− τ |
2 |τ | , (14)
shown in Fig. 2. From Fig. 2 it is clear that, even if the channel is strongly antidegradable, QKD can be secure.
This is due to the existence of the secure region for 0 < τ ≤ 1/2 and ε < ε◭(τ). Notice that for τ > 1, i.e., for
an amplifying channel, reverse reconcilation is outperfomed by direct reconciliation. This is in accordance with the
previous results of Ref. [19].
According to the expression of IAE in Eq. (12), the Alice-Eve channel can also be described by an additive-noise
channel where the input classical signal α (with variance µ) is modulated by an equivalent channel’s noise χ−1 and a
homodyne detection noise ∆ = 1. In fact, we retrieve the same mutual information IAE of Eq. (12) by considering
VE = µ+∆+ χ
−1 , VE|A = ∆+ χ
−1 , (15)
and taking the asymptotic limit for µ→ +∞. By considering both the Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve channels, one easily
checks that the optimal {τ, ω}ind has therefore an equivalent additive description when direct reconciliation and high
modulation are considered. Such an additive description corresponds to an individual OGC attack where Eve clones
the input signals with cloning variances χb = χ and χc = χ
−1, stores her clones in a quantum memory and, then,
makes the correct homodyne detections after the basis revelation [20]. Such an individual attack is optimal since
the saturation of the uncertainty principle χbχc = 1 minimizes the information-disturbance trade-off, which can be
expressed by the product of the output conditional variances
VB|AVE|A = (∆ + χ)(∆ + χ
−1) . (16)
In direct reconciliation and high modulation, an individual OGC attack with noise χ represents therefore an equivalent
additive description of the optimal attack {τ, ω}ind via Eq. (6). To be precise, there is a whole class of optimal attacks
{τ, ω}ind, with different τ and ω but the same χ = χ(ω, τ), which are equivalent to an individual OGC attack. Notice
that this equivalence is true for the “switching” protocol of Ref. [3], but not for the “non-switching” protocol of
Ref. [4].
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated recent notions and properties of the one-mode Gaussian channels in the scenario
of quantum cryptography. In particular, we have considered the canonical attacks, which are the cryptographic analog
of the canonical forms. We have adopted the individual version of these attacks in order to study the connections
between the degradability properties of a Gaussian channel and its security for QKD. We have also explicitly clarified
the connections between the various notions of degradability and antidegradability. Finally, we have shown some
connections between individual canonical attacks and optimal Gaussian cloners.
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